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THE
TRUTH
ABOUT
TIBET.

BY
A. MACCALLUM SCOTT.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY
SIR ROBERT REID, K.C. M.P.

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By the same Author.

WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL.

BY

A. MACCALLUM SCOTT.

WITH PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

An appreciative record of an adventurous career and of a new and powerful force in politics. The scope and intention of the book are best indicated by the Table of Contents: Youth and Genius—Subaltern of Hussars—"The Bright Eyes of Danger"—The South African War—The Member for Oldham—"The Tattered Flag"—Army Reform—The Fair Trade Issue—The Parting of the Ways—Rallying the Opposition—A Future Leader.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

This little volume deals with a subject to which the mass of British electors have probably given less attention than it deserves. We have a multitude of anxieties at home. Life is hardly long enough to master the complicated problems of domestic reform. No wonder that so many turn away from a study of the tedious Blue Books which show how our representatives ten or twelve thousand miles away have mis-managed our interests and those of the dependency they are appointed to govern.

Yet it is imperative that public opinion in this country should be directed to subjects of this kind. Nearly all the wars in which we have been engaged during the last ninety years have arisen from the supposed necessities, not of the United Kingdom itself, but of the British dominions or dependencies beyond the seas. They often begin in comparatively trifling disputes. Hasty or ambitious Proconsuls are

allowed to adopt a peremptory tone without a sufficient appreciation at home either of the real cause of quarrel or of the danger involved in precipitate action. Before the true situation is grasped in England, a step has been taken from which it is difficult to recede, or a pretension advanced which a false pride declines to withdraw. Thus the country finds itself committed to enterprises which sometimes lead to enormous expenditure and loss of life, or to unnecessary complications with Foreign Powers. Our national debt and our vast military and naval expenditure bear eloquent testimony to the mischievous zeal of British representatives thousands of miles from our shores, to the weakness or unwisdom of Ministers who ought to check them, and the culpable apathy of public opinion. The Crimean war, the war in Afghanistan in 1878, and the South African war, ought to have taught us all a lesson.

Mr. Scott has done a public service by presenting in a succinct form the salient features of the Tibet affair. The work is done skilfully and conscientiously. It brings out the flimsy pretexts for quarrel, the veiled ambition of the Indian Government to secure a political foothold at

Lhasa, the deplorable slaughter, the inability of a weak Minister in London to control his subordinates in India, and the futility of the entire proceedings for any practical purpose. It is not necessary that readers should agree in every point with Mr. Scott. They can hardly fail to agree in his main conclusions if they approach the subject without prepossession.

The aggressive folly which led to the fruitless invasion of Tibet may, if unrestrained in the future, lead to enterprises that will involve the whole Empire in war.

R T. REID.

PREFACE.

The following account of the Mission of Col. Younghusband to Lhasa, and of the preceding negotiations, is based upon the official documents contained in the three Blue Books, "Papers relating to Tibet":—

[*Cd. 1,920*] 1904, price 3s. 1d., covers from the conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 to the dispatch of the "Mission" to Gyantse.

[*Cd. 2,054*] 1904, price 3½d., deals with the affair at Guru, and the arrival of the "Mission" at Gyantse.

[*Cd. 2,370*] 1905, price 2s. 5d., deals with the advance to Lhasa, the conclusion of the Lhasa "Convention," and the subsequent conflict between the Home Government and the Indian Government.

To these papers the reader is referred for further information.

A. M. S.

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
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SKETCH MAP.

Route of Col. Younghusband's Mission.

THE TRUTH ABOUT TIBET.

CHAPTER I.

THE ANGLO-CHINESE CONVENTION OF 1890.

LORD CURZON'S BRIEF.

THERE is a passage in one of Lord Curzon's argumentative dispatches to the Secretary of State for India, in which he sums up concisely all the arguments whereby he prevailed upon an unwilling Government to give its consent to the recent Expedition to Lhasa.

We do not think it possible that the Tibetan Government—which we dissociate entirely from the Tibetan people—should be allowed to ignore its treaty obligations, to thwart trade, to encroach upon our territory, to destroy our border pillars, and to refuse even to receive our communications. Still less

do we think that, when at last an amicable conference has been arranged for the settlement of these difficulties, we should acquiesce in our Mission being boycotted by the very persons who have been deputed to meet it, our officers insulted, our subjects arrested and ill-used, and our authority despised by a petty power which only mistakes our forbearance for weakness, and which thinks that by an attitude of obdurate inertia it can once again compel us, as it has done in the past, to desist from our intentions. (Cd. 1920, p. 221.)

Until the evidence is examined, this statement has all the appearance of being a good brief to speak from, but to anyone who has examined with an unprejudiced mind the evidence contained in the three Blue Books dealing with our negotiations with Tibet, it will appear to be no more than a travesty of the facts. It is impossible to point to a single provision of the Convention which governed our relations with Tibet which had been infringed by the Tibetans. The object

of this article is to show that this, and the other charges contained in the above extract, are not only misrepresentations but perversions of the truth.

THE POLICY OF ISOLATION.

In the first place it is necessary to understand that for upwards of a century the rulers of Tibet have pursued a rational and deliberately conceived policy of isolation and exclusion as regards Europeans. They have observed that throughout the Asian continent, in the native states of India, in the Central Asian Khanates, and in China, European intrusion has inevitably been followed by European dominion. All their diplomacy has been consistently directed to one end, to preserve their country to themselves. This policy of isolation is a perfectly *bona fide* policy, and they have scrupulously observed it in both its aspects. It is not a subterfuge to provide an Alsatia from which evil-doers can emerge to prey upon the neighbouring provinces, and to which they can withdraw again, escaping the responsibility for their actions. While on the one

hand it has been a policy of "exclusion," on the other hand it has been a policy of "non-intervention" in the affairs of others. To such a logical extreme have they carried this policy, that they have maintained no army either for offence or for defence. Their policy did not contemplate the possibility of war, and they had no use for an army. All they asked of the world was to be let alone.

The Indian Government, however, has been trained in another school. In its eyes Tibet is a potential market to be opened up for British trade, a possible field for the expansion of British dominion, a pawn in the high political game with Russia. A self-contained, self-sufficient Tibet is only an "extraordinary anachronism" to be swept off the board as soon as possible. The whole history of the Tibetan question may be summed up as one persistent effort on the part of the Indian Government to break down the barrier of reserve with which the Tibetan Government has hedged itself about. The Anglo-Indian has been the active and the Tibetan the passive agent through-

out, and the rôle has never varied. The very phrase "passive resistance" is officially used to describe Tibetan tactics (Cd. 1920, p. 46). All the aggression has come from our side. Official after official, and finally the Viceroy himself, has brought to bear every expedient and device known to Western diplomacy to induce, cajole, or frighten the Tibetans into negotiations. Every one of them has been blandly foiled with Oriental cunning. But relations of one kind or another the Indian Government was determined to establish, and in the end it has abandoned diplomacy and resorted to force.

THE ANGLO-CHINESE CONVENTION.

The present chapter in the relations between India and Tibet begins in 1890 with the signing of the Convention between China, as the nominal Suzerain of Tibet, and Great Britain, in settlement of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier dispute. The governing clause of the Convention denoted the crest of the mountain ranges separating the waters flowing into certain rivers as the boundary

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between Tibet and the Indian Protectorate of Sikkim. Questions of trade, pasturage, and methods of communication were specifically reserved for future arrangement. At the end of 1893 the regulations on these reserved questions were definitely agreed upon and attached to the Convention. They came into effect on May 1, 1894. As regards trade the regulations provided that a "trade-mart" should be established at Yatung, on the Tibetan side of the frontier, which should be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade, and that, with certain exceptions, all goods should be admitted to this mart duty free for a period of five years, after which a tariff might be mutually agreed upon. As regards pasturage the British Government was empowered to make regulations, to be observed by Tibetans grazing their cattle on the Sikkim side of the frontier. Finally, communications between the Government of India and the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet must be made through the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer.

ALLEGED INFRINGEMENTS.

Considerable effrontery is required to class the refusal of the Tibetans "even to receive our communications" with breaches of "treaty obligations." Lord Curzon's three letters addressed to the Dalai Lama direct were returned unopened, because the Tibetans maintained that China being the Suzerain Power all communications should be addressed to the Chinese officials. Moreover, the armed "Mission" of Colonel Younghusband, unless distinct provocation can be shown, will appear to violate the clause of the Convention which binds both parties "to respect the boundary as defined." Referring again to Lord Curzon's statement of his case, it will be seen that the charge of ignoring treaty obligations is associated with the encroaching upon our territory, the destroying of our border pillars, and the thwarting of trade. A categorical denial both to the general and to the detailed charges is furnished by the official documents contained in the Blue Book (Cd. 1920).

(A) QUESTIONS OF FRONTIER.

It has been alleged that the Tibetans violated the frontier clause by refusing to assist in the demarcation, by destroying boundary pillars, and by grazing their cattle in Sikkim territory. As a matter of fact, beyond the general denotation of the watershed, the Convention made no provision for the actual demarcation of the frontier. After assisting in the fixing of the first pillar the Chinese authorities withdrew on account of the suspicion the proceedings excited among the natives. Subsequently this pillar was overthrown, but the action had no political significance, and in the words of Lord Elgin, who was then Viceroy, there was "no evidence that the mischief was to be directly attributed to the Tibetan officials" (p. 25). In view of the suspicion Lord Elgin did not think it worth while proceeding with the demarcation, and in withdrawing the British Commissioner from the border he remarked that "No serious practical inconvenience had apparently arisen through the frontier being undemarcated." As to pasturage, it

was expressly provided in the regulations that the Tibetan shepherds should be permitted to graze their flocks during summer on the Tibetan side of the frontier. To the north of Sikkim lie some poor pasture lands, at a very high altitude, and uninhabitable during the greater part of the year. The inclusion of these lands on the British side of the frontier had always been a sore point with the Tibetans, and that their sense of grievance was not unfounded is acknowledged by Lord Elgin's observation that "in respect of territory near Giaogong the Tibetans possess claims which it would not only be impolitic but inequitable to ignore." Nothing happened from the Tibetan side save that the shepherds continued to graze their flocks there. In order to be able to bring pressure to bear in demanding further trade concessions Lord Curzon resolved to occupy this territory with an armed force. But further consideration and fuller knowledge made him realise that the grazing rights on each side of the frontier were reciprocal, and that the Indian Government stood to lose more than it gained by a dog-

in-the-manger policy. In his own words (p. 151):—

We have since learned from Mr. White that the grazing rights on the Sikkim side of the border which had been usurped by the Tibetans are, in fact, balanced by similar rights which are conceded to the Sikkimese across the Tibetan border, and that the *status quo* is probably the most convenient arrangement in the interests of both parties.

(B) THE QUESTION OF TRADE.

It has also been alleged that the Tibetans failed to carry out their treaty obligations with regard to trade. It is true that the Convention and the regulations proved wholly ineffective to promote commercial and other relations with Tibet, not because the Tibetans violated them, but because “regulations” are not sufficient in themselves to promote trade and co-operation where the will and the spirit are wanting. It was one thing to style Yatung a “trade-

mart" and to give British traders and their goods a free entry there. But it was quite another thing to bring Tibetan traders there. The Indian Government received no more than the pound of flesh which the regulations stipulated. There was no clause compelling Tibetan merchants to buy or sell goods at Yatung.

It has, however, been argued that the spirit of these regulations was broken by the imposition of a 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty upon goods at Phari, a Tibetan town fifty miles further into the interior. It is sufficient to quote an official communication from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (p. 31):—

Phari is a considerable distance from the frontier, and, unless it could be shown that the duty to which Mr. White refers was a special one newly imposed, it appears doubtful whether the Government of India could enter a valid objection.

Subsequently, Mr. P. Nolan, the Commis-

sioner for the Rajshahi Division, reports (p. 54):—

My information is that it has existed for a long time. Mr. Macauley noticed it in 1884.

To which the Secretary to the Indian Government rejoined (p. 58):—

It would, therefore, seem that no new and vexatious restrictions, not in conformity with local usage, have been imposed on the trade with Sikkim and Bengal.

The fact was, that as an instrument for the development of trade relations with Tibet the Convention of 1890, with the regulations attached, was useless. The regulations were open to revision in 1899, and the Indian Government resolved to use every effort to secure further substantial concessions. To gain these it was prepared to sacrifice other nominal advantages. Protracted efforts were made to secure new trading privileges by offering in exchange to hand over the pasture lands already

mentioned at Giaogong. But after involved and futile negotiations, Mr. P. Nolan, the Commissioner of Rajshahi, finally wrote (p. 104):—

As far as I can judge the Tibetans value their isolation more than their pastures, and would not exchange the first for the second.

DEMAND FOR NEW CONCESSIONS.

The story of these negotiations, or rather attempted negotiations, must be left to the Blue Book. Life is too short to recount here all the expedients, subterfuges, and subtle devices known to the Oriental mind, whereby Chinese and Tibetan authorities alike sought to evade the pushful diplomacy of the Indian Government. The anomalous position of China, as the nominal suzerain, afforded endless opportunities for equivocation and procrastination. The Tibetans refused to negotiate except through the Chinese. The Chinese pleaded for delay in order to allay the suspicions of the “stubborn and stupid” Tibetans. Delegates were

appointed and fell ill. Transport failed, servants deserted, the season of the year was unsuitable. Just when a start seemed likely to be made the delegates were recalled to report. The Chinese Resident was recalled to Peking. His successor would take six months to reach Lhasa. Wên Hai succeeded Kwei Hwan, and Yu T'ai succeeded Wên Hai. After years of strenuous effort on both sides, the delegates are at last got together, and it is discovered that the Tibetan representatives absolutely refuse even to consider the extension of trading privileges. After painfully pushing through all the subterfuges, British diplomacy, still more painfully, runs its head against a stone wall.

CHAPTER II.

THE MISSION TO KHAMBA JONG.

AN "ALTERED POLICY."

So far there has been nothing to complain of in the attitude of the Indian Government. It was seeking by means of legitimate diplomatic pressure to develop relations with Tibet. The "forward" inclinations of the local officials had been held in check by the central Government under Lord Elgin. But the advent of Lord Curzon as Viceroy brought a new factor into the situation. Almost from the beginning he began to play a forcing game. He quickly convinced himself that all the arts and artifices of diplomacy had been exhausted, and he fell back in the last resort upon frank coercion. In July, 1901, he began to hint at "an altered policy" (Cd. 1,920, p. 119). Hitherto British diplomacy had proceeded on the assumption that trade relations were the essential factor. In January, 1903 (p. 150), Lord Curzon

changed at one stroke the whole basis of the situation. "What we are concerned to examine," he said, "is not the mere settlement of a border dispute, or even the amelioration of our future trading relations with Tibet, but the question of our entire future political relations with that country." He proceeded to formulate his "altered policy" as follows:—

We propose that the negotiations should cover not merely the small question of the Sikkim frontier, but the entire question of our future relations, commercial *and otherwise*, with Tibet; and we think that they should culminate in the appointment of a permanent British representative, consular or diplomatic, to reside at Lhasa. (p. 155.)

THE RUSSIAN BUGBEAR.

To justify this reversal of our traditional policy towards Tibet, Lord Curzon furbished up the old bugbear of Russian intrigue. In itself this was an absurd *non sequitur*, for

even with the Russians in Lhasa, the northern defences of India would have been secured by the Himalayas, the most impregnable barrier that nature ever provided, or man ever improved. But the charge was baseless. Not a tittle of evidence was produced in support of the allegation of Russian intrigue, unless we can count as evidence unsupported newspaper clippings and bazaar gossip. In July, 1901, the Russian papers reported that a certain Dorjief had been received by the Czar on a mission from the Dalai Lama. Count Lamsdorf gave our Ambassador an explicit assurance that the Tibetan visitors were not charged with "any diplomatic or political mission," but that Dorjief was simply a "Mongolian Buriat of Russian origin," who had visited Lhasa as the native Indian Buriats do, and who was now making money collections for his Order from the numerous Bhuddists throughout Russia. The other shred of evidence was a report in the *China Times* that a secret treaty had been concluded between Russia and China with regard to

Tibet. A direct and categorical denial was given to this rumour by the Chinese Government to our Ambassador. Not only so, but the Russian Ambassador in London assured Lord Lansdowne in comprehensive terms—

That there was no Convention about Tibet, either with Tibet itself or with China, or with anyone else, nor had the Russian Government any Agents in that country, or any intention of sending Agents or Missions there. (Cd. 1,920, p. 187.)

His Majesty's Government, we are told, regarded these assurances as "satisfactory" (Cd. 2,370, p. 46); nevertheless, Lord Curzon made bold to speak of "the arrangements freshly concluded with another Great Power to our detriment" (Cd. 1,920, p. 155).

The Home Government was undisturbed by Lord Curzon's cry of "Wolf." After a careful consideration of his representations and of his proposals for "an altered policy," Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, replied that the Government

had "come to the conclusion that it would be premature to adopt measures so likely to precipitate a crisis" (Cd. 1,920, p. 185).

A LOOPHOLE.

Then Lord Curzon saw a loophole, which, it is safe to say, hardly another Englishman would have discovered. In 1902, attempts had been made to secure a conference with Chinese representatives at Yatung, the only place in Tibet to which, by the terms of the Convention, Europeans were admitted. Delegates were duly appointed, but the usual episodes happened to prevent a meeting. Mr. White, the British representative, arrived at Yatung, but there was no one to receive him. Not till Mr. White had departed in despair and disgust did the Chinese representatives arrive with profuse expressions of surprise and regret. There was nothing, they protested, they desired more than a meeting. They had waited at Yatung, in considerable discomfort, for over three months; but, if the Indian Government did not "find it convenient to discuss matters at Yatung," why then—

We are, and have been, prepared to proceed to such places as may seem to His Excellency the Viceroy more desirable for the discussion of the points at issue. (Cd. 1,920, p. 196.)

“CHILDLIKE AND BLAND.”

This was the loophole. In a flash Lord Curzon seized upon the phrase, and it did duty thereafter in many a dispatch. This surely might be construed as an invitation to send a Mission into Tibet. “Such place as may seem to His Excellency the Viceroy more desirable!” Done! Tibet itself, the “Forbidden Land,” was “more desirable” than any other place. For years he had been looking for a foothold. If only he could venture all, and name Lhasa! But he must walk slowly at first. On June 3rd, 1903, he wrote to the Chinese Amban accepting the invitation, and naming as the rendezvous Khamba Jong, a post in the interior of Tibet, between twenty and thirty miles from the frontier, and over seventy miles north of Yatung. On the same day he despatched Colonel Younghusband, with

an armed escort of 200 men, to await the Chinese representatives. There must be no time left for explanations.

The consternation and distress of the Chinese and Tibetans was almost comical. In their innocence they had imagined that the choice of Lord Curzon would be limited by the terms of the Convention, and that he would name some place on British territory. It had not occurred to them that the request to name another place of meeting would or could be construed as a surrender of their rights, recognised by the Convention, to exclude Europeans from their country. But the Viceroy was resolved to acknowledge no scruple. His preparations were made with diligence and secrecy, and before the protests of the startled Oriental diplomatists were received he was able to confront them with a *fait accompli*. On July 7th the Mission arrived at Khamba Jong, and Lord Curzon was meditating his next step.

VIOLATING THE CONVENTION.

There is not the shadow of a doubt that the Mission to Khamba Jong was a delibe-

rate violation of the Convention of 1890, carried out with a high-handed disregard for the elementary principles of international law. The Home Government had consented to the dispatch of the Mission "to open negotiations with China and Tibet for the fulfilment of treaty obligations," on the representation of Lord Curzon that the Chinese authorities were "willing to negotiate at any place acceptable to us." The Home Government was hoodwinked, and the Tibetan authorities were rushed. From the moment that the Mission began to approach the frontier both Tibetan and Chinese representatives ceased not in their protests against this invasion. Their case is stated clearly, simply, and unanswerably in a communication addressed by the Chinese Frontier Commissioners to Mr. J. C. White, Joint Commissioner with Colonel Younghusband:—

Chinese Frontier Commissioners, Ho and Parr, request British Commissioners not to proceed across the frontier fixed by 1890 Convention. Khamba Jong

being on Tibetan side of frontier is an unsuitable rendezvous. (Cd. 1,920, p. 223.)

The reply, addressed to a weak power like Tibet, was insolent. Had Tibet been a strong Power it would have been audacious:—

The objection to Khamba Jong as a rendezvous, merely on the ground that it is Tibetan Territory, would not for a moment be recognised by Colonel Younghusband and myself. It is obvious that the delegates from each side must meet on either Tibetan Territory or on British Territory, and we might with equal justification object to meeting the Chinese and Tibetan delegates on British Territory, as you now object to meeting us on Tibetan Territory. (Cd. 1,920, p. 223.)

A “COMMERCIAL MISSION.”

The efforts of the Chinese Amban were directed, in the first place, to preventing the violation of the frontier, and, in the second place, to restraining the unarmed Tibetans from attempting to meet invasion by force.

“You may flick a dog once or twice without his biting, but if you tread on his tail, even if he has no teeth, he will turn and try to bite you,” observed the distracted Jongpen of Khamba Jong in picturesque metaphor. The Mission reached its destination, however, and the opposition of the Tibetans was confined to a sullen, passive resistance. Every attempt by Colonel Younghusband to open negotiations was met by the reiterated request that he should withdraw to the frontier. In fear of an attack, this extraordinary “Commercial Mission” entrenched itself in the open, with Maxims trained and ready. But though large numbers of Tibetans began to assemble along the lines of further advance, no attack was made upon the camp or upon the individual officers as they freely explored the neighbourhood. In Colonel Younghusband’s words, after two months stay at Khamba Jong:—

Their present policy is one of passive obstruction. They have made up their minds to have no negotiations with us *inside* Tibet; and they will simply leave us here. (Cd. 1,920, p. 267.)

CHAPTER III.

THE ADVANCE TO GYANTSE.

Meantime Lord Curzon was not resting in idleness. The Mission to Khamba Jong was no more than a piece of elaborate make-believe. He had more serious work in hand. He was arranging for enormous supplies of transport animals, and was concentrating troops in the neighbourhood of the Jelapla Pass, the entrance to the Chumbi Valley, up which ran "the best trade route and military road to Lhasa." Khamba Jong was "high and exposed," and the prospect of wintering there was anything but a pleasant one, even had there been anything to gain from it. Lord Curzon now began to press upon the Home Government the desirability of taking some further step to bring pressure to bear upon the Tibetans. Lhasa was his goal, but he walked warily. His new proposal was the occupation of the Chumbi Valley and an advance to Gyantse, which might be regarded as the half-way house to Lhasa.

THE TWO LACHUNG MEN.

A pretext was not far to seek. In July, after the "Mission" had invaded Tibetan territory and occupied a fortified camp at Khamba Jong, two Lachung men, British subjects, were sent to Gyantse, and two others to Shigatse, to spy out the land. The two former duly returned with a report as to the movements of the Tibetans; the two latter were stopped and detained by the Tibetans, an action which, in the circumstances, seems not unreasonable. (Cf. Captain O'Connor's Diary, Cd. 1,920, p. 245.) Rumours that they had been imprisoned and beaten, and finally tortured to death, were eagerly seized by the British diplomatists, and the two Lachung men began to occupy the most important place in the correspondence. Here at last seemed to be a real grievance, an actual and indubitable outrage on the part of the Tibetans, the lack of which had hitherto been the weak point in the Anglo-Indian diplomacy. As a matter of fact, the two men were produced at Lhasa, nine months later, safe and sound, and in the best of condition, having been

well treated, but in the meantime their imaginary sufferings served a useful purpose. The immediate return of the men was demanded, together with compensation to the amount of Rs. 2,000, and, pending the receipt of this sum, 200 yaks and fifty sheep belonging to Tibetans were seized on the pastures at Giaogong. The arrest of two native spies was represented as the seizure of British subjects "who had proceeded to Shigatse to trade," and the old *civis Romanus sum* appeal was made to the Home Government.

FORCING THE PACE.

The Home Government was wholly opposed to the aggressive designs of Lord Curzon against the independence of Tibet, but it found it difficult to resist his representations with regard to his invitation to Khamba Jong and the subsequent ignoring of the British representatives there, and with regard to the imprisonment of British subjects. The Secretary of State was not unmoved by these considerations, but he confessed to "grave misgivings" with

regard to any advance into the interior. Only "if complete rupture of negotiations proves inevitable" was he prepared to sanction the proposed advance to Gyantse through the Chumbi Valley. Unfortunately it was at this critical point that the reconstruction of the Cabinet, consequent on the fiscal agitation of Mr. Chamberlain, occurred. Lord George Hamilton retired, and Mr. Brodrick, unversed but self-confident, took up the reins. Lord Curzon was pressing. Mr. Brodrick looked up the last letter of his predecessor, and found "that the advance was contingent on a rupture of negotiations." Has this condition been fulfilled, he asked? Lord Curzon must have smiled sardonically as he replied:—

The rupture of negotiations with Tibet (if, indeed, negotiations can be said to have ever taken place) is not only inevitable, but has taken place. (Cd. 1,920, p. 216.)

It sufficed. On November 6th, 1903, the advance to Gyantse was authorised, and

Lord Curzon proceeded to take the second step in his tortuous progress towards Lhasa, the one goal of his policy.

A MID-WINTER ADVANCE.

No time was lost. Already it was the depth of winter, and the main advance was impossible, but, as a move in the high diplomatic game, it was considered desirable to effect a lodgment in Tibetan territory as soon as possible. The "Mission," with its armed escort, several thousand men in all, was hurried across the bleak and inhospitable Jelapla Pass, high up in the Himalayas, which guards the entrance to the Chumbi Valley. On December 25th, General Macdonald, in command of three battalions and two companies, arrived at Phari, some fifty miles up the valley, and occupied the fort. Colonel Younghusband pushed on ten miles further, with the "Mission" and a considerable escort, to Tuna. There they remained in winter quarters during the months of January, February, and March, 1904. Frost-bite and pneumonia played havoc with the Sepoys, and, as one corre-

spondent says, "the thousands of beasts of burden which succumbed to the rigours of these high altitudes might supply material for an 'Epic of the Yaks.'"

During all these months nothing in the shape of negotiations took place. Colonel Younghusband's instructions were to reach Gyantse, and not to treat before he got there. The Tibetans, on the other hand, confined themselves to daily protests and to urgent requests that the armed men should withdraw to the frontier. Large numbers of Tibetans armed with spears and matchlocks assembled on the line of advance, but they made no attack upon the camp, nor committed any other act of hostility. Technically we were at peace with Tibet, and the army which had occupied Tibetan territory was no more than a "Commercial Mission." Such are the resources of diplomacy.

Nothing could have been more embarrassing to the Indian Government than this sullen attitude of passive resistance. What, after all, was the good of going to Gyantse, if the only result was to be the repetition of

the old story with damnable iteration? The reluctant Home Government must be supplied with a pretext for more drastic action. It was found before long in tragic fashion.

A PLEDGE.

In a telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, reference is made to a pledge given by Colonel Younghusband to the Tibetans. In view of what subsequently took place its terms are important :—

The Tibetan General at Yatung is reported by Colonel Younghusband to have asked to be given a pledge that if the Tibetans make no attack upon us, no attack will be made by us on them. To this Colonel Younghusband has replied that we are conducting the Mission, under adequate protection, to a place better fitted for negotiations, that we are not at war with Tibet, and that, unless we are ourselves attacked, we shall not attack the Tibetans. (Cd. 1,920, p. 304.)

This pledge was not only approved by Mr. Brodrick, but strict injunctions were given that its "spirit" must be observed. The sequel is distressing.

THE SLAUGHTER AT GURU.

By the end of March it was considered that the season of the year was favourable to the further advance to Gyantse. On March 30th the troops marched out of Tuna to make a reconnaissance northwards. As Mr. Candler, the Correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, has said: "The extraordinary affair that followed must be a unique event in military history."* About eight miles on the way, they came upon a force of about 2,000 Tibetans, assembled on the road near the Hot Springs at Guru. The Tibetans had built, as was their futile custom, a wall of loose stones across the valley. The Tibetan General rode out to meet the British, and vehemently implored them to retreat. He was told that "the Tibetan soldiers must be removed from position, or our troops would

* "The Unveiling of Lhasa," by E. Candler, p. 102.

have to clear a way." (Cd. 2,054, p. 9.) With this answer he rode back. General Macdonald, who was in charge of the troops, then deployed the Gurkhas and Pioneers, and trained his Maxims and mountain battery upon the Tibetan position. The huddled and formless mob of Tibetan peasantry was armed with home-made rifles, matchlocks, spears, knives, and stones. In Colonel Younghusband's words, "they were surrounded to such a degree that our men were pointing their rifles into the camp over the wall" (Cd. 2,054, p. 5). They were then informed that if they "would surrender their arms they would be permitted to retire." But they did not wish to give up their arms, as, indeed, why should they? The Sikhs were then moved up and ordered to disarm them forcibly. "It was a ridiculous position," says an eye-witness,* "Sikh and Mongol swaying backwards and forwards as they wrestled for the possession of swords and matchlocks." The make-believe could not endure. A rush was made in a corner of

* "The Unveiling of Lhasa," by E. Candler, p. 105.

the camp, then somewhere in the swaying mob a shot was fired. What followed is horrible to contemplate. It was not a battle, but a shambles; not a stand-up fight, but a massacre. Into the dense mass of Tibetans, packed together on barely an acre of ground, was poured volley after volley of rifle fire from the surrounding troops extended in scientific firing line. The Maxims played upon them their devastating streams of bullets. Broken and bewildered, they attempted to retreat. The scene, as described by Mr. Candler, is unforgettable. They *walked!*

They were walking away! Why, in the name of all their Bodhisats and Munis, did they not run? There was cover behind a bend in the hill a few hundred yards distant, and they were exposed to a devastating hail of bullets from the Maxims and rifles that seemed to mow down every third or fourth man. Yet they walked!*

* "The Unveiling of Lhasa," by E. Candler, p. 109.

AN INGLORIOUS VICTORY.

Aye, even as they walked, the fierce lust for slaughter followed them up. When the business was completed it was found that on the British side one war correspondent was severely wounded, and one officer had lost two fingers, while the Tibetan casualties killed and wounded, were at least 700. Let us humble ourselves as we recall the pledge of Colonel Younghusband to the Tibetan General when he crossed the frontier: "We are not at war with Tibet, and unless we are attacked we shall not attack the Tibetans." "Perhaps no British victory," says Mr. Candler, "has been greeted with less enthusiasm than the victory at the Hot Springs. Certainly the officers, who did their duty so thoroughly, had no heart in the business at all."

But the embarrassment of the Indian Government was at an end. The Tibetans had committed an act of war. They had made an unprovoked attack upon a peaceful "Commercial Mission." A pistol shot had indubitably been fired. An officer had lost two fingers. Diplomacy could now be flung

to the winds, and "military operations" were the order of the day. Thenceforward a new word began to appear in the dispatches. It was no longer "The Tibetans," but "The Enemy."

On April 11th the "Mission,"—for this anomalous title was still applied to it—arrived at Gyantse, the limit imposed by the Home Government for its advance. Now the spell had been broken, and "the dog without teeth" was trying to bite the aggressor. *Morituri te salutamus.* With futile but splendid courage they withstood the invaders of their country. Their ridiculous matchlocks were a source of danger only to themselves. With their spears and swords they rushed forward in face of an exterminating fire and flung their bodies down upon the violated threshold. A hundred and ninety Tibetan corpses marked the trail of the British advance between Guru and Gyantse. Twice as many wounded must have crawled away to hide their agonies in mountain dens or peasant hovels. The British casualties amounted to three wounded.

A HALT AT GYANTSE.

The fort at Gyantse was occupied, and for three months the "Mission" remained there, endeavouring to open negotiations and being met with the stereotyped demand to return to the frontier. It was a repetition of the farce at Khamba Jong, with this difference, that the tedium was tragically relieved by repeated assaults upon the fort and by excursions to burn villages, or to disperse a large Tibetan force at Karola, forty-two miles from Gyantse, on the line of further advance. Lord Curzon now pressed upon the Home Government the suggestion "that some definite limit of time should be imposed," and that, unless negotiations were opened before the time elapsed, a further advance towards Lhasa should be sanctioned. This was now his case. He had been invited to send representatives to negotiate at Khamba Jong, and his representatives had been treated with contumely; two British subjects had been arrested and were rumoured to have suffered imprisonment, torture, and even death; and finally,

the peaceful "Commercial Mission" had been wantonly attacked by armed force. Mr. Brodrick was unable to withstand such specious advocacy, and on May 12th he telegraphed the welcome words: "Recent events make it inevitable that the Mission must advance to Lhasa, unless the Tibetans consent to open negotiations at Gyantse." That blessed word "inevitable!" Lhasa at last!

AT LAST!

The limit of time was promptly fixed. June 25th was named as the last day of grace allowed to the Tibetans for opening negotiations. Reinforcements consisting of eight companies of infantry, one mule corps, and four guns, were called up from India. No negotiations took place or were expected, and on July 14th the "Mission" set out upon the last stage of its advance. Practically, no further opposition was encountered. Lhasa was reached on August 3rd; the Mystery of Asia was at last unveiled; the sacred city of Buddhism lay at the feet of a European invader.

CHAPTER IV.

THE LHASA "CONVENTION."

WITH the arrival of the Expedition at Lhasa Lord Curzon was able to congratulate himself upon the accomplishment of the first part of his "altered policy," which the Home Government had refused to sanction. At last he had got rid of the embarrassing Treaty of 1890, the existence of which had hitherto placed an effective check upon his aggressive designs. A clean sweep had been made of all its hampering restrictions. Tibet was no longer in the position of an independent negotiator, but of a conquered enemy. The next step was to settle the terms of the new "treaty" or convention. In defining these terms Tibet counted for nothing. They were frankly dictated to her. Lord Curzon's struggle was with the India Office, which had not only refused to sanction his "altered policy," but had given definite pledges to Russia that Britain harboured no designs against Tibetan independence.

MR. BRODRICK'S POLICY.

The telegram of November 6th, 1903, in which Mr. Brodrick authorised the advance to Gyantse is a landmark in these confused and involved proceedings. In it he laid down in clear and unmistakable terms the policy of His Majesty's Government:—

They are, however, clearly of opinion that this step should not be allowed to lead to occupation or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs *in any form*. The advance should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and as soon as reparation is obtained a withdrawal should be effected. While His Majesty's Government consider the proposed action to be necessary, they are not prepared to establish a permanent Mission in Tibet, and the question of enforcing trade facilities in that country must be considered in the light of the decision conveyed in this telegram. (Cd. 1,920, p. 294.)

Nothing has happened which, in the view of his Majesty's Government, necessitated the alteration of this policy. From its point of view the object of the expedition was solely to secure the redress of grievances, the observance of the previous treaty, and reasonable facilities for the development of commercial relations.

LORD CURZON'S POLICY.

Lord Curzon's policy, on the other hand, was one of complete political domination. He was resolved upon securing a solid and permanent footing in Tibet, and all the powers of his subtle intellect were directed towards sapping and mining the position of the Home Government. Too wise to defy openly the instructions of the Secretary of State, he set about attacking them in detail. He skilfully entangled Mr. Brodrick in long and devious arguments, trapped him into loose and unguarded amplifications of his originally definite and precise statements. If the attempt to arrogate the control of Tibetan affairs be vetoed, surely there could

be no objection to forbidding the Tibetans to have any relations with any other Foreign Power without our consent. In Lord Curzon's words, we should require "a formal recognition of our exclusive political influence in Tibet." If the proposal to establish a permanent mission at Lhasa were vetoed, surely there could be no objection to retaining for the trade agent at Gyantse the privilege of "proceeding to Lhasa as occasion may require to discuss matters with the Chinese Amban or with the high officials of the Dalai Lama." Even if Tibet proper must be evacuated, the question of the Chumbi Valley might be considered separately, inasmuch as it "lies to the south of the main watershed, and is Indian rather than Tibetan in character." And if the Home Government is pedantic enough to regard the Chumbi Valley as coming within the scope of its pledge not to annex Tibetan territory, there could be no harm in "reserving to ourselves the right to construct such communications as roads, railways, telegraphs, &c."

BRODRICK *v.* CURZON.

It was a singular duel between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. Mr. Brodrick has many excellent qualities—honesty of intention, devotion to what he considers his duty, and great industry and application—but, unfortunately, these excellent qualities are accompanied by a narrow intelligence, a slow wit, and a complacent self-satisfaction. He is stubborn rather than strong, and obstinate rather than determined. Such a man is difficult to drive, but easy to lead or to cajole. An artful subordinate might lead him by the nose, while he would never suspect but that the whole initiative and inspiration proceeded entirely from himself. But let him once feel that he is being played with and he will plunge wildly. Lord Curzon, on the contrary, is a man of remarkable intellectual power, but his intellect is of the subtle rather than of the robust order. He has travelled much in the East, and he practises the characteristic diplomacy of the East with a more than Oriental cunning. Tenacious in his opinions, resolute in his determination, and conscious of his superior

ability, he knows that more ways than one lead to Rome. His training has been that of a politician and not of a civil servant. He has been accustomed to advocate a policy rather than to accept one. To place such a man as this in subordination to Mr. Brodrick was to invite disaster if ever a conflict of wills should arise.

FINAL INSTRUCTIONS.

In consenting to the Expedition in the first instance, and in sanctioning its various advances until at last it reached Lhasa, Mr. Brodrick was completely hoodwinked. When it came to the settlement of the terms to be imposed at Lhasa, he bore himself with greater credit; but it cannot be denied that in consenting to Clause IX. of the "Convention," which forbade Tibet to grant concessions to or enter into any relations with any Foreign Power without the previous consent of the British Government, he adopted a very large measure of Lord Curzon's policy. Moreover, the language which he sometimes used in the course of the involved argument contained loose and

ambiguous expressions which Lord Curzon was not slow to take advantage of, and to twist to his purpose. There were two points, however, to which Mr. Brodrick clung as the sheet anchor of his policy. He was determined that there should be no permanent Mission established in Tibet, and that there should be no annexation of Tibetan territory. In his telegram of July 26th (Cd. 2,370, p. 42), in which he summed up his final instructions as to the terms of the "Convention," he laid down specifically (1) that "neither at Lhasa nor elsewhere is Resident to be demanded," and (2) as regards an indemnity, that "the sum to be demanded should not exceed an amount which, it is believed, will be within the power of the Tibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, spread over three years," and that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley as security for the indemnity and the opening trade marts will continue till the payment of the indemnity shall have been completed, or the marts opened effectually for the space of three years, whichever is the latest."

A RUDE AWAKENING.

Mr. Brodrick's awakening was a rude one. Two successive shocks were in store for him. In the first place, the "Convention" which Colonel Younghusband compelled certain Tibetan officials to sign provided for the enormous indemnity of Rs.75,000,000, payable in 75 annual instalments of Rs.1,000,000 each, and during these 75 years the Chumbi Valley was to be occupied by the British as security. In the second place, some two months after the signing of the "Convention," Mr. Brodrick was astounded to learn by letter, not by telegraph, that Colonel Younghusband had concluded a separate agreement authorising the British trade agent at Gyantse to proceed as occasion might require to Lhasa. Lord Curzon, having exhausted every art in the effort to move Mr. Brodrick from his definite instructions, had determined to take the bold step of disregarding them and then confronting Mr. Brodrick with a *fait accompli*. As regards the subsidiary agreement, Mr. Brodrick disallowed it with-

out hesitation, but as regards the indemnity and the occupation of the Chumbi Valley some very intricate manœuvring took place.

THE INDEMNITY.

Immediately on the terms of the "Convention" being communicated to him, Mr. Brodrick pointed out that the provisions regarding the indemnity and the occupation of the Chumbi Valley were "inconsistent" with his instructions. Three days later he authorised the reduction of the indemnity from Rs.75,000,000 to Rs.25,000,000, and a stipulation that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley should cease after three years' successful working of the customs arrangements. Lord Curzon ingeniously suggested that, in return for these concessions, the Tibetans might reasonably be asked to extend the trading privileges, and Mr. Brodrick fell into the trap. His instructions, as to the reduction of the indemnity, were meant to be final and absolute, but he added to them the following rider, which left a narrow loophole of ambiguity :—

In no circumstances is the force to prolong its stay at Lhasa for the purpose of obtaining more favourable terms than those already agreed to. Subject to these orders we leave it to Younghusband to secure from the Tibetans, in consideration of reduction of indemnity, any or all of the concessions mentioned in your telegram.

Lord Curzon and Colonel Younghusband chose to interpret this permission to accept any concession the Tibetans might be willing to grant as a definite instruction to make the reduction of the indemnity a matter of bargaining, and Mr. Brodrick, though his intention was obvious, was certainly careless in his expression.

“DEFIANCE” AND “DISOBEDIENCE.”

When these instructions reached Colonel Younghusband he had already completed his arrangements to leave Lhasa on the following day. A thousand difficulties conveniently

presented themselves to prevent his prolonging his stay—difficulties of transport, of supplies, of climate, of the reluctance of the Tibetans to “reopen the negotiations.” He left Lhasa, as he had arranged, without altering the terms of the Convention in any way, calmly suggesting that the matter might be arranged “eventually.” On being acquainted with this action Mr. Brodrick despatched an indignant telegram accusing Colonel Younghusband of “defiance of express instructions” in regard to the terms of the Convention, and of “disobedience to orders” in leaving Lhasa without altering them. It was natural that the brunt of Mr. Brodrick’s anger should fall upon the immediate agent, but Colonel Younghusband is by no means without a case. He occupied the unfortunate position of having to serve two masters with absolutely incompatible policies, and it must be remembered that his dealings were not directly with the Secretary of State, but that his instructions reached him through the alembic of the Viceroy. Lord Curzon is the real marplot, and it is to him that the rebuke should be administered.

THE CONVENTION AMENDED.

The open breach ended the matter. The Indian Government has no *locus standi* from which it can defy the Imperial Government with the Imperial Parliament behind it. Mr. Brodrick was master of the situation. The subsidiary agreement was remorselessly disallowed. When the "Convention" was ratified at Simla, a declaration was attached whereby the indemnity was reduced from Rs.75,000,000 to Rs.25,000,000, and a pledge was given that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley would cease on the payment of three annual instalments, provided that the trade marts as provided in the "Convention" had been effectively opened three years. The Declaration was signed by the acting Viceroy, Lord Ampthill, Lord Curzon being at home on leave.

WHAT SHALL IT PROFIT ?

And what profit have we, in the end, of all this shady diplomacy and inglorious slaughter? Colonel Younghusband has

brought back with him from Lhasa a "Convention" unsigned by two of the principals, while the third has disallowed one of its principal stipulations. Being unable to prevent the entry of the Mission into Lhasa, the Dalai Lama did what was, from his point of view, the next best thing, he fled from Lhasa himself. When Colonel Young-husband reached his goal, there was no one for him to negotiate with. The device which he adopted would not stand examination in any impartial international tribunal. He got the Chinese Amban to proclaim the "temporary" deposition of the Dalai Lama, and then he set up a temporary Government of his own—a miscellaneous assortment of all the officials and ecclesiastics he could lay hands on. Their worthless signatures and seals are all duly attached to the "Convention" in imposing array, but they have no more binding effect than if the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Chairman of the London County Council were to sign a new treaty with France. The Chinese Amban refused to sign without the express sanction of his Government at Peking. For all

practical purposes Colonel Younghusband might have done his share of the signing at Calcutta. The only validity that the "Convention" has is derived from the continued exercise of force. Tibet has entered into no obligations. We revert to the *status quo ante*, with this difference, that there is no longer indifference, but hatred, beyond the Himalayas.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX I.

THE ANGLO-CHINESE CONVENTION, 1890.

*Convention between Great Britain and China relating to
Sikkim and Tibet.*

Whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires ; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say ;

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, His Excellency the Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, His Excellency Shêng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor,

Who having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form,

have agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles :—

- I. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmoochi on the Bhutan frontier and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nipal territory.
- II. It is admitted that the British Government, whose protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognised, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.
- III. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I., and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.
- IV. The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.
- V. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of

the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

VI. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

VII. Two Joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which by the last three preceding Articles have been reserved.

VIII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

In witness whereof the respective negotiators have signed the same and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta this seventeenth day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety, corresponding with the Chinese date the twenty-seventh day of the second moon of the sixteenth year of Kuang Hsü.

[SEAL]

(Sd) LANSDOWNE.

[Chinese
seal and
signature.]

APPENDIX II.

THE REGULATIONS.

*Regulations regarding Trade, Communication, and
Pasturage to be appended to the Sikkim-Tibet
Convention of 1890.*

I. *Trade.*—A trade-mart shall be established at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the first day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade at that mart.

II.—British subjects trading at Yatung shall be at liberty to travel freely to and fro between the frontier and Yatung, to reside at Yatung, and to rent houses and godowns for their own accommodation, and the storage of their goods. The Chinese Government undertake that suitable buildings for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Regulation I. to reside at Yatung. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexatious restrictions. Such British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their persons and property. At Lang-jo and Ta-chun, between the frontier and Yatung, where rest-houses have been built by the Tibetan authorities, British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.

III.—Import and export trade in the following Articles—Arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs—may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IV.—Goods, other than goods of the descriptions enumerated in Regulation III., entering Tibet from British India, across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or *vice-versâ*, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years commencing from the date of the opening of Yatung to trade, but after the expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariff may be mutually agreed upon and enforced.

Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into England, but trade in Indian tea shall not be engaged in during the five years for which other commodities are exempt.

V.—All goods on arrival at Yatung, whether from British India or from Tibet, must be reported at the Customs Station there for examination, and the report must give full particulars of the description, quantity, and value of the goods.

VI.—In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese frontier officer. The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice, where there is a divergence of views the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

VII. *Communication.*—Despatches from the Govern-

ment of India to the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the Chinese frontier officer, who will forward them by special courier.

Despatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government of India will be handed over by the Chinese frontier officer to the Political Officer for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.

VIII.—Despatches between the Chinese and Indian officials must be treated with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to and fro by the officers of each Government.

IX. *Pasturage*.—After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of Yatung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such Regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given of such Regulations.

GENERAL ARTICLES.

I.—In the event of disagreement between the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese frontier officer, each official shall report the matter to his immediate superior, who in turn, if a settlement is not arrived at between them, shall refer such matter to their respective Governments for disposal.

II.—After the lapse of five years from the date on which these Regulations shall come into force, and on six months' notice given by either party, these Regulations shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who shall be

empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments and extensions as experience shall prove to be desirable.

III.—It having been stipulated that Joint Commissioners should be appointed by the British and Chinese Governments under the 7th Article of the Sikkim-Tibet Convention to meet and discuss, with a view to the final settlement of the questions reserved under Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the said Convention ; and the Commissioners thus appointed having met and discussed the questions referred to, namely : Trade, Communication, and Pasturage, have been further appointed to sign the agreement in nine Regulations and three General Articles now arrived at, and to declare that the said nine Regulations and the three General Articles form part of the Convention itself.

In witness whereof the respective Commissioners have hereto subscribed their names.

Done in quadruplicate at Darjeeling this 5th day of December in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, corresponding with the Chinese date the 28th day of the 10th moon of the 19th year of Kuang Hsü.

(Signed) HO CHANG-JUNG,
JAMES H. HART,
(Seal) *Chinese Commissioners.*

(Signed) A. W. PAUL,
(Seal) *British Commissioner.*

APPENDIX III.

THE LHASA CONVENTION, 1904.

Convention between Great Britain and Tibet.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

I.

The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I. of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all

obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand—equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs—to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees one lakh each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II., III., IV., and V., the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity has been paid and

until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, which ever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyangtse and Lhasa.

IX.

The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government,—

- (a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power ;
- (b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs ;
- (c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet ;
- (d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government ;
- (e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lasha, this seventh day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month of the Wood-Dragon year.

Tibet Frontier Commission.

Seal of British Commissioner.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel,*
British Commissioner.

Seal of the Dalai Lama affixed by the
Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche.

Seal of Council.

Seal of the Dre-pung Monastery.

Seal of Sera Monastery.

Seal of Ga-den Monastery.

Seal of National Assembly.

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

[Signed and sealed as above.]

(Signed) AMPHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Convention was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the eleventh day of November, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and four.

(Signed) S. M. FRASER,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

APPENDIX IV.

SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT.

The Government of Tibet agrees to permit the British Agent, who will reside at Gyantse, to watch the conditions of the British trade, to visit Lhasa, when it is necessary, to consult with high Chinese and Tibetan officials on such commercial matters of importance as he has found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or by personal conference with the Tibetan Agent.

Sealed and signed at Lhasa, the 7th September, 1904, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month of the Wood-Dragon year.

[Seal] F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel,*
British Commissioner.

[Seal] Seal of Dalai Lama affixed by the
Ti-Rimpoche.

[Seal] [Seal] [Seal]

Seal of the Council.

Seal of the Dre-pung Monastery.

Seal of the Sera Monastery.

[Seal] [Seal]

Seal of the Ga-den Monastery.

Seal of the Tsong du (National Assembly).

APPENDIX V.

DECLARATION.

Signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratified Convention of 7th September, 1904.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, having ratified the Convention which was concluded at Lhasa on 7th September, 1904, by Colonel Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government; and by Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, the three monasteries Sera, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly, on behalf of the Government of Tibet, is pleased to direct as an act of grace that the sum of money which the Tibetan Government have bound themselves under the terms of Article VI. of the said Convention to pay to His Majesty's Government as an indemnity for the expenses incurred by the latter in connection with the despatch of armed forces to Lhasa, be reduced from Rs.75,00,000 to Rs.25,00,000; and to declare that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity as fixed by the said Article, provided, however, that the trade marts as stipulated in Article II. of the Convention shall have been effectively opened for three years as provided in Article VI. of the Convention;

and that, in the meantime, the Tibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects.

AMPTHILL,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This declaration was signed by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the eleventh day of November, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and four.

S. M. FRASER,

*Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.*

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